Paranoia, unfounded fears that others intend harm, has predominately been studied in schizophrenia. Increasingly, it is recognised that there is a spectrum of severity of excessive mistrust across the general population. Relatively little is known about paranoia in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), but rates could be expected to be higher given both difficulties in understanding others' mental states and frequent experiences of negative social interactions. A systematic search of English-language peer-reviewed publications was undertaken to synthesise empirical research about paranoia in ASD. Seven studies, comprising a total of 180 ASD participants, met the inclusion criteria. All the studies were crosssectional, thereby limiting causal interpretations. Individuals with ASD were consistently found to have higher levels of paranoia compared to non-clinical controls, and lower levels than individuals with current psychotic experiences manifesting in the context of schizophrenia. Furthermore, the initial evidence indicates that paranoia in ASD may be linked with theory of mind performance, negative affect, and jumping to conclusions, but not attributional style. As in typically-developing populations, causal and maintaining mechanisms for paranoia in ASD, against a background of genetic and environmental risk, most likely include cognitive and affective processes interacting with social factors. We hypothesise however, that core ASD characteristics and associated neurocognitive impairments also serve to precipitate and perpetuate paranoia. A framework to guide further investigation is outlined.
Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are childhood onset, behaviourally defined, neurodevelopmental conditions. Core ASD characteristics include socio-communication impairments, adherence to non-functional rituals and routines, and engagement in a narrow repertoire of interests and activities (APA, 2014; WHO, 1992) . ASD prevalence rates are reported to just exceed 1% of the population (Brugha et al., 2011) , however given significant clinical heterogeneity, and potential sex differences in symptom profiles (Van WijngaardenCremers et al., 2014) , it is conceivable that rates are underestimated (NICE, 2011, 2012).
Although diagnostic overshadowing may mar a full assessment of psychopathology, studies consistently indicate that individuals with ASD are highly likely to experience psychiatric co-morbidities (Joshi et al., 2013; Russell et al., 2015; Simonoff et al., 2008) , including anxiety disorders (White, Oswald, Olendick & Scahill, 2009) , obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Cadman et al., 2015) , low mood and depression (Ghaziuddin, Ghaziuddin & Greden, 2002) , and psychosis (Chisholm, Lin, Abu-Akel & Wood, 2015) . Similarly, transdiagnostic characteristics -i.e. symptoms which can manifest across a range of psychiatric disorders -occur commonly. Such characteristics can include problems with eating and 'food selectivity' (Marí-Bauset, Zazpe, Mari-Sanchis, Llopis-González & Morales-Suáres-Varella, 2014), sleep disturbance (Elrod & Hood, 2015) , emotion dysregulation (Weiss, 2014) , and paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001 ).
Recent research indicates that paranoia (ideas of reference and persecution) exists on a spectrum of severity in the general population , similar to the profile of common mental health problems such as anxiety and depression (Plomin, Haworth & David, 2009 ). This is unsurprising: every day, people make decisions about whether to trust or The contribution of genetic and environmental causes to the occurrence of paranoia has been examined in one large classical twin design study (Zavos et al., 2014) , whereby paranoia was assessed dimensionally in five thousand adolescent twin pairs; it was found that the contribution of genes and environment was approximately equal. Several psychological mechanisms have been hypothesised to precipitate and perpetuate paranoia (Frith, 1992; Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001; Freeman & Garety, 2014) . Since almost by definition mental states are being misread in paranoia, theory of mind impairments have been proposed as a cause (Frith, 1992) . Similarly, the explanation of events in terms of malevolent others has implicated a generalised externalising and personalising attributional style linked to unstable and negative self-views (Bentall, Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001 ). Another view is that at the centre of paranoia are ideas about threat, linked to anxiety and depression, negative self-beliefs (including interpersonal sensitivity), and adverse life experiences (Freeman & Garety, 2014) . Reasoning biases, such as 'jumping to conclusions' (reduced data-gathering), have also been considered a contributory causal factor to the levels of conviction and failure to consider alternative explanations seen in paranoia (Garety et al., 2015) . Enhancing understanding of paranoia in ASD is important for several reasons. Our view is that it is theoretically plausible that this clinical population are at an increased risk of paranoid ideation. This increased risk may stem, in part, from the social consequences of having ASD. For example, individuals who have ASD desire friendships and intimate relationships, yet they are often rebuffed, and are prone to being bullied and victimised (Schroeder, Cappadocia, Bebko, Pepler & Weiss, 2014) ; experiences which can exacerbate social withdrawal, augment concerns about others, and encourage negative beliefs about the self and others (e.g. Gracie et al., 2007) . But it may also be that neurocognitive processes associated with ASD enhance the likelihood of paranoia. Difficulties in understanding others' intentions (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste & Plumb, 2001a) , a tendency for being detail-focused (commonly referred to as weak central coherence; Happé & Frith, 2006) , and problems with cognitive flexibility (Wilson et al., 2014 ) may render individuals with ASD vulnerable to information or interpretation biases, encouraging the negative misinterpretation of others' actions.
In summary, although paranoia may well co-occur with ASD, it is unclear whether rates and levels are comparable to those reported for typically-developing clinical and non-clinical populations. Also, it is uncertain whether there is a degree of ASD-specificity to paranoia, i.e.
whether core ASD or associated characteristics serve to precipitate or maintain paranoid features. In the typically-developing population, there is increasing evidence to suggest that timely assessment and psychological interventions (specifically cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT)) can reduce paranoia, associated distress, and secondary symptoms (e.g. Freeman et al., 2015) . Whether this is also the case for the ASD population warrants consideration. The aims of this review were threefold: (1) to synthesise empirical data about ASD and paranoia; (2) to propose a conceptual framework outlining mechanisms potentially contributing to the development and maintenance of paranoia; and (3) to highlight implications for clinical practice and research.
Method

Search strategy
Four databases were searched -Medline, PsycInfo, PubMed, and the Cochrane Central The search terms used were autis*-asperger*-pervasive development* disorder* AND paranoi*.
Study inclusion and exclusion criteria
We employed several search parameters, as follows: (1) primary observational, experimental or intervention studies; (2) published in peer-reviewed English language publications; and (3) focusing on paranoia (measured using clinical diagnostic criteria, or a subjective self-rating scale) in young people or adults with ASD (including all diagnostic subtypes). We allowed for the possibility that study participants may have additional comorbidities and/or intellectual disability (ID). We excluded: (1) grey literature (including nonpeer-reviewed and non-academic publications); and (2) studies that included participants diagnosed with ASD and psychosis (or schizophrenia), but where reports did not demarcate paranoid features from other positive symptoms of psychosis.
Analysis plan
A narrative approach to the analysis was undertaken, due to methodological heterogeneity.
Results
Search results and data extraction
The database searches were undertaken by JS; results were imported into EndNote . One further study was identified which was published during manuscript preparation, and sub-group data were obtained MT personal communication, July 2015) . A total of seven studies, therefore, met the prespecified inclusion criteria, which were read by all three authors. Data were extracted, summarised, and tabulated. 
Overview of studies
Seven studies, all employing cross-sectional designs, were included in the review (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004; Jänsch & Hare, 2014; Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2015) . See Table 1 for a summary of study details. All studies bar one (Pinkham et al., 2012) , were undertaken in the UK. Each study described levels of paranoia in individuals diagnosed with ASD compared to control groups. The aims of studies differed somewhat: one study examined associations between autistic traits and psychotic experiences in adolescents ; three studies explored the link between theory of mind and paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004; Jänsch & Hare, 2014) ; two studies investigated relationships between attributional style and paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004) ; one study examined selfrepresentation and self-awareness in conjunction with paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001) ; one study considered associations between probabilistic reasoning style and paranoia (Jänsch & Hare, 2014) ; one study assessed similarities and differences in paranoid ideation between clinical and non-clinical populations (Pinkham et al., 2012) ; three studies described levels of anxiety and depression, co-occurring with paranoia (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008);  and finally, two studies measured paranoia in the context of interrogative suggestibility, compliance and vulnerability (Maras and Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008) .
Participant characteristics
A total of 180 individuals with ASD (152 males and 28 females) participated across studies, most of whom were diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome. ASD diagnosis was primarily confirmed via clinical criteria. Additionally, three studies (Jänsch & Hare, 2014; Maras & Bowler, 2012; Taylor et al., 2015) asked participants to complete the Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001b) , four studies undertook the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-g; Lord et al., 2000) with a proportion of participants (Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012 , and three studies (North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2015) obtained data from the Autism Diagnostic Interview-revised (ADI-r; Lord, Rutter & Lecouteur, 1994) .
IQ data were estimated from the National Adult Reading Scale (NARS; Nelson, 1982) , the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1991) Wechsler, 2004) . At group level, mean full scale IQs fell within the average range.
There were limited data reported about other demographic characteristics (such as ethnicity), and clinical characteristics (such as psychiatric co-morbidity, or receipt of mental health services).
Quality assessment of included studies
We did not use a standardised checklist to formally assess methodological rigour of included studies. Nonetheless, several considerations are noteworthy when appraising the study methods and results. First, while ASD participants were recruited from clinical and nonclinical settings, response rates (i.e. the percentage of participants who agreed to take part versus those who declined) were not provided. It may be that some individuals were deterred from taking part, given the study remits, thereby skewing the representativeness of samples. Second, ASD was not necessarily assessed using 'gold-standard' objective instruments: as such, the severity and spread of symptoms, i.e. whether participants presented with more social or communication impairments were not documented. Hence, the degree to which ASD participants within each study and across studies represent a homogeneous (or heterogeneous) group is not known, with implications for the generalisability of study findings. Third, each study relied on a single self-report measure of paranoia, completed at one time point. Given that the utility of self-report questionnaires in ASD remains a contentious issue, study methods could have been enhanced through inclusion of a clinicianadministered measure, or a second self-report paranoia scale, i.e. to establish construct validity or inter-rater reliability. It is also the case that self-report measures are unable to determine if paranoid ideas endorsed, are actually unfounded. Additionally, psychological variables examined in studies, including theory of mind, attributional and reasoning styles, self-esteem, and affect, were also primarily measured using one form of assessment; some of which were self-report instruments, and as such their validity and reliability for the ASD population is uncertain. Confidence in study results could therefore have been augmented with the addition of an alexithymia measure to ascertain the extent to which participants were able to describe their internal states, as well as further tests of neuropsychological functioning (e.g. local versus global processing styles, cognitive flexibility, recall and memory). Fourth, while appropriate choice of comparison group clearly depends on the key hypothesis tested, it is of note that each study included at least one comparison group (a clinical and/or non-clinical control group), but no study included an ASD control group, i.e. either individuals with ASD who presented with no paranoia, or a comparison between individuals who have low and high levels of paranoia. As there are hypothesised differences between ASD and typically-developing individuals -for example, in terms of genetics (Miles, 2011) , neuroanatomy (Stanfield et al., 2008) , and neuropsychological functioning (Wilson et al., 2014) -it is possible that direct comparison with other ASD samples, or individuals with developmental disorders, would prove useful. Similarly, not all studies matched participant groups on baseline variables, including age, IQ, and potential past or current mental health. Given that these factors may influence or confound performance on tests, the implication is that results and inferences drawn may be called into question. In each study, ASD participants -at a group level -endorsed higher levels of paranoia, compared with non-clinical controls (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; Jänsch & Hare, 2014; Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008; Pinkham et al., 2012; Taylor et al., 2015) . Conversely, ASD participants self-reported lower levels of paranoia compared to individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004; Pinkham et al., 2012) , and higher levels compared with a schizophrenia non-paranoid group (Pinkham et al., 2012) . Pinkham et al. (2012) also put forward evidence that paranoia in ASD included a higher degree of 'social cynicism' compared to patients with schizophrenia, which they considered as evidence of qualitatively different factors leading to paranoia in ASD. Taylor and colleagues (2015) examined relationships between autistic traits and paranoia in an adolescent sample, a proportion of which (n=32) were also diagnosed with ASD. Furthermore, Craig and colleagues (2004) found a negative correlation between scores on the PS (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and theory of mind measures (RMET, r = -0.37, p = <0.01; Hints task, r = -0.25, p = <0.05), suggesting that neuropsychological functioning impairments may be implicated in paranoia in this group.
Establishing rates of paranoia
Associations between autistic traits and paranoia
Attributional style
Attributional style was measured using the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001 ) and the Attributional Style Structured Interview (ASSI; unpublished;
Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004) . At group level -and in both studies -there were no significant differences between attributional styles of participants with ASD, and non-clinical controls. Individuals with schizophrenia however, were more likely to 'externalise attributions for negative events', and display a global attributional style, compared with ASD participants (Craig, Hatton, Craig & Bentall, 2004) . Blackshaw and colleagues (2001) also examined correlations between attributional style, paranoia and theory of mind, and found no significant relationships between these variables ('overall model' -F (6, 24) = 1.75, p = 0.152).
Self-representation and self-awareness
Self-awareness and self-representation were explored in one study via the SelfDiscrepancies Questionnaire (SDQ; adapted from Higgins, 1986 Higgins, , 1987 ) and the SelfConsciousness Scale (SCS; Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001) . Given that individuals with ASD may experience innate difficulties in their ability to distinguish between self and others, and self-awareness, assessment of these constructs can prove complex but not insurmountable (see Hobson, 2010 ).
Nonetheless, there were no significant differences in SDQ scores, between the ASD and nonclinical control groups. However, individuals with ASD displayed significantly higher levels of private self-consciousness, and comparable levels of public self-consciousness and social anxiety. Using regression analyses, it was also reported that private self-consciousness was a potential predictor variable (in this cross-sectional study) for paranoia (beta = 0.529, t = 3.42, p = 0.0019).
Reasoning style
The data-gathering 'jumping to conclusions' (JTC) reasoning style was assessed in one study (Jänsch & Hare, 2014) . Using a computerised version of the 'beads task' participants were asked to gather data in a reasoning task until they were sure in their judgement. There were significant differences, at group level, in the number of beads requested and rates of JTC bias. In both versions of the task, individuals with ASD made fewer requests for additional information: 50% of ASD participants displayed a JTC bias in version A, compared with 34% in version B. These rates are broadly comparable to those seen in studies of patients with delusions in the context of schizophrenia (Dudley et al, 2015) .
Anxiety and depression
Self-ratings of anxiety and depression were obtained via the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) (Blackshaw, Kinderman, Hare & Hatton, 2001; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008) , and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) (Maras & Bowler, 2012) . In each of these studies, ASD participants endorsed higher levels of depression and anxiety, compared with non-clinical controls. Differences between groups however, were only found to be significant by North and colleagues (2008) .
Fear of negative evaluation
In order to investigate social-evaluative concerns about others, The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) was administered in two studies (Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjusson, 2008) . The BFNE has good psychometric properties, albeit that the questionnaire involves reverse-item scoring, which feasibly can prove confusing (e.g . Weeks et al., 2005) . In both studies, ASD participants endorsed more social evaluative concerns compared to non-clinical controls, albeit that differences between the groups were not significant. Potential associations between paranoia and FNE were not reported in detail.
Self-esteem
Self-esteem was measured by Maras and Bowler (2012) , using the Rosenberg Self Esteem scale (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) ; a measure commonly used with research and clinical populations, and which has good construct validity and a similar 'factor structure' across settings (e.g. Schmitt & Allik, 2005) . At group level, there were no differences in mean scores: neither group scored within the low self-esteem range.
Suggestibility, vulnerability and compliance
Two studies investigated suggestibility and compliance in adults with ASD (Maras & Bowler, 2012; North, Russell & Gudjonsson, 2008) , with the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 2 (GSS-2; Gudjonsson, 1997) , and the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989 ). There were no significant differences in scores, between groups, on the GSS-2 (Gudjonsson, 1997) . Group differences were found on the GCS (Gudjonsson, 1989) in one study (North, Russell & Gudjonsson, 2008) : ASD participants had higher scores compared to the non-clinical control group. Relationships between scores on the GCS, the GSS-2 and the PS were examined in one study (Maras and Bowler, 2012) : significant associations were found between the GSS-2 and PS in the ASD group only (r = 0.52, p < 0.01), a finding which was accounted for by the fact that a proportion of the participants had scored particularly highly.
Overview
Paranoia is increasingly recognised as a common experience in the general population, but relatively little is known about this phenomenon in ASD. To address this gap, we carried out the first systematic review on the topic. Seven cross-sectional studies met the pre-specified review inclusion criteria, highlighting the relative neglect of this topic in research. Across all studies, ASD participants had higher levels of paranoia compared with non-clinical controls.
Furthermore, individuals with ASD had lower levels of paranoia compared with individuals with current psychotic experiences in the context of schizophrenia. It was also found that associations between attributional style and paranoia were not significant; theory of mind impairments were comparable for the ASD and schizophrenia groups, and more severe compared to non-clinical controls; ASD participants had higher levels of anxiety, depression, and social-evaluative concerns, compared to non-clinical samples (albeit that not all differences reached significance); and there were indications that individuals with ASD had a jumping to conclusions reasoning style. The findings concerning correlates of paranoia are broadly similar to those found in the wider paranoia literature. That is, paranoia is associated with both negative affect and reasoning biases. Associations with externalising bias in patients with schizophrenia have been similarly hard to replicate . What could be different in the results in the current review are the potential links with theory of mind impairments. 
Conceptualising paranoia in ASD
If replicated in larger samples however, the high levels of paranoia in these ASD studies warrant explanation. A framework may aid such investigation. We hypothesise that causal and maintaining factors for paranoia in this clinical population share many similarities with typically-developing individuals, but that there is also likely to be an ASD-specificity which renders this group more vulnerable to developing mental health characteristics and paranoid features in particular (see Figure 3 for a schematic representation) . First, we suggest that the combination of core ASD characteristics (in particular, difficulties with initiating and maintaining social interaction, deficits in the quality and quantity of conversational interchange, and preferences for routine), and aspects of neuropsychological functioning (specifically, weak central coherence, theory of mind impairments, cognitive inflexibility, and attentional problems), inform the means through which individuals with ASD think about themselves, others, and the world. We suggest that common cognitive styles include rumination (e.g. Crane, Goddard & Pring, 2011; Gotham, Bishop, Brunwasser & Lord, 2014), as well as a tendency for "all or nothing" thinking, over-generalising and catastrophising. We speculate that these factors shape the way in which individuals with ASD engage in, relate to, and make sense of the social world. For example, this group often have a literal interpretation of social norms and conventions, which can result in an inappropriately formal, incongruent, or awkward social style. Further, rather than being aware of social nuances and subtle variations between social situations -and hence modifying social behaviour accordingly -individuals with ASD are more likely to adopt a formulaic approach, rather indiscriminately. In a bi-directional fashion, core ASD and associated characteristics affect the way in which others respond to them. For example, we note that social experiences for this clinical population can often seem, or be, aversive (e.g. being encouraged to engage in social situations such as group activities, needing to deal with unexpected social interactions, or being unable to undertake routinised behaviours), and/or adverse (e.g. being teased, victimised, or rejected). In either instance, social adversity is likely to have a bearing on beliefs, emotions, and behavioural responses. Over-generalisation of past experiences may encourage rumination, and enhance the propensity for catastrophising about future social situations. It is also plausible that these experiences contribute to negative core schema (for example, relating to themes of inferiority, worthlessness, a sense of difference, and hence vulnerability), which subsequently contribute to assumptions about others, and negative thoughts in situ as well as pre-and postsocial interactions (for example, "why are they laughing at me?", "something might happen to me", and "people can't be trusted"). Additionally, we predict that these difficult experiences lead to, or exacerbate pre-existing negative affect, such as anxiety and low mood. Behavioural reactions potentially include an increase in social withdrawal, social isolation, avoidance, increased engagement in routines, and rumination. Although these are understandable shortterm behavioural coping strategies, in the longer term they can prove to be unhelpful, as they reinforce anxiety, worry, and negative beliefs. We propose therefore that the combination of these predisposing factors, difficulties arising in the context of social interactions, and cognitive, behavioural, and affective responses, increase the potential for paranoid thoughts, general mistrust, and concerns about risk from others. 
Limitations
This review has several limitations. First, we excluded non-English language publications. Second, because the remit of this review was symptom-focused rather than diagnosis-led, we excluded studies that investigated schizophreniform disorders (including schizophrenia, psychosis or bipolar affective disorder), or delusional beliefs in ASD, but where paranoia data were not reported, i.e. whereby total symptom scale information rather than sub-scale scores were provided. Third, we did not contact authors of studies that included typically-developing participants recruited due to high levels of paranoia, some of whom may conceivably have also met ASD diagnostic criteria.
Research implications
Five key areas warrant research. First, study findings suggest that levels of paranoia may well be higher in ASD compared with non-clinical controls. This, however, remains to be definitively demonstrated. Such future studies could aim to establish whether levels of paranoia differ according to ASD diagnosis or symptom profiles, and other characteristics such as IQ, sex, and age. Ideally, studies should incorporate objective measures of ASD -in order to facilitate investigation of childhood and current symptom profiles -and it would prove useful for samples to comprise individuals who have comparable ASD presentations, i.e. representing a more homogenous group. Second, we suggest that a more comprehensive assessment of neuropsychological functioning processes, including theory of mind, memory, and attention, are needed, in order to better understand the extent to which drivers for paranoia in ASD are similar or distinct from typically-developing samples. Third, the ecological validity of self-report paranoia measures in ASD is uncertain: it may be that some social situations described do not apply or statements may be interpreted too literally (Maras & Bowler, 2012) .
Hence, future studies should include several methods of assessment, such as an informantrating or clinician-administered scale, as well as different self-report measures, so as to be able to establish the reliability and validity of these instruments, and to enhance understanding of the paranoia symptom profile in ASD. Alternatively, virtual reality techniques have been used to assess paranoia in typically-developing populations in order to accurately assess unfounded ideation (Freeman, 2008b) ; such methods may also be suitable for individuals with ASD (Parsons & Mitchell, 2002) 
Clinical implications
Several implications for clinical practice are pertinent. It is easy to assume that social avoidance, and concerns about others' intentions and actions, are attributable to core ASD characteristics. We suggest, however, that clinicians should be mindful that individuals with ASD may well have paranoia i.e. excessive mistrust, potentially manifesting in the absence of psychosis or schizophrenia. It is therefore pragmatic to establish whether this is the case, so as to disentangle contributory factors that account for presenting difficulties. This is likely to involve a considered approach on behalf of clinicians, and is contingent on the development of rapport and therapeutic trust. Also, it may be that operationalisation of terminology, e.g. 'anxiety' or 'paranoia', would prove useful (Attwood, 2004) . In terms of treatment, CBT is reported to be effective for reducing paranoid features and secondary symptoms (e.g. Freeman et al., 2015) , although no studies have sought to specifically target paranoia in individuals with ASD. We perceive that CBT interventions may well have clinical utility for concomitant paranoia in ASD, but that several adaptations may be needed, as is also the case when treating other psychiatric comorbidities (Lang et al., 2010; Spain et al., 2015) . We suggest that the formulation used to guide treatment (at least in the short term) focuses on maintaining mechanisms rather than causal factors. Also, due to difficulties with introspection, and alexithymia (Bird and Cook, 2013) , it may be easier to support individuals with ASD to start noticing links between situations, behavioural responses, and beliefs rather than focusing on the role of affect. While cognitive interventions are likely to be crucial, e.g. in order to address assumptions and beliefs about the self and others, it may be that an appropriate starting point is to offer psycho-education (e.g., about social relationships), social skills interventions (e.g., to enhance verbal and non-verbal communication skills), and behavioural techniques (e.g., to increase assertiveness skills, and to reduce social withdrawal). Further, it may be that targeting other symptoms, e.g. anxiety or low mood may also help to reduce paranoid features. Finally, as in treating all paranoia, suitably individualised direct behavioural tests are needed to help individuals relearn that they are safe.
Conclusion
Paranoia in ASD is an under-researched area, but potentially clinically important. The early indications are that levels of paranoia are raised in ASD. There are plausible grounds for expecting interactions between ASD core and associated characteristics, and paranoia, with each exacerbating the other. However, the mechanisms underlying these relationships are yet to receive systematic scrutiny. In this paper we have outlined the findings from the extant literature and proposed a framework which may help guide future investigations. Paranoia PS
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• ASD participants had higher paranoia scores, compared to the NCC participants • ToM deficits were more evident in the ASD, compared to the NCC group • There were no significant differences, between groups, in causal attributions: both groups used personal and situational external attributions; and they were equally as likely to attribute negative and positive events to themselves • There were no significant differences, in selfcontext, between groups • ASD participants had significantly higher levels of private self-consciousness; a variable found to be associated with paranoia.
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• Paranoia scores differed between groups: the SCZ participants had the highest scores; the ASD group had higher scores than the NCC group, but lower scores than participants with SCZ • ToM deficits were comparable between ASD and SCZ groups, and greater than the NCC group • ToM and paranoia were negatively correlated in the ASD group • There were no significant differences, between groups, in attributional style 
